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Abstract: This paper analyses the effect of public expenditure on economic growth from both a theoretical 
and an empirical point of view. Given that the economic literature supplies numerous and conflicting views 
on the topic, the article offers a framework combining both theories of market failures and State failures to 
account for an inverted U-shaped relation between government size and GDP growth. The empirical 
contribution is to provide evidence through a long time-series analysis of the existence of such a relation on 
the period 1871-2008 for France, which offers one of the longest stable democratic periods to analyse.  
Keywords: Public Spending, Public Expenditure, Government Size, BARS Curve, Armey Curve, 
Economic Growth, Market Failure, State failure, France. 
 
Taille optimale du secteur public et croissance en France (1871 – 2008): Une explication par les 
défaillances de l’Etat et du marché. 
Résumé : Cet article étudie les effets des dépenses publiques sur la croissance économique de 
la France sur la période 1871 – 2008 à la fois d’un point de vue empirique et théorique. Il propose dans une 
première section une revue de la littérature et dans une deuxième section un modèle théorique pour rendre 
compte de l’existence d’une courbe en U-inversée ou d’une relation non linéaire entre dépenses publiques 
et croissance économique. Il teste dans une troisième section l’existence de cette courbe pour la France et 
montre que la taille optimale du secteur public pour ce pays et pour la période d’observation choisie est 
d’environ 30% du PIB national, au-delà de ce chiffre la dépense publique a un effet négatif sur la 
croissance économique. 
Mots clés : dépenses publiques, taille optimale de l’Etat, Courbe d’Armey, croissance 
économique, défaillances de l’Etat et du marché. 
 
JEL classification : H11, P44, H50 
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1. Introduction 
The relation between public expenditure and economic growth has traditionally been a topic 
of considerable interest for economists and more recently for political leaders. Indeed, the 
topic is currently of burning importance especially in the United States and European Union 
because most countries have been confronted with an increasing public debt and a drop in 
their economic growth since 2007. Faced with the crisis, governments, like the American 
Congress, chose to support economic activity with reflationary policies i.e. public spending, 
thus increasing public deficit and public debt. This choice seems to have been justified by the 
Keynesian paradigm, based on a virtuous cycle of public spending through the multiplier 
effect. As a result, for instance in France in 2010, the total public spending represented 
56.60%2 of the French GDP and the ratio of public debt to GDP is expected to be 91%3 in 
2013. Thus the economic policies in France and in most other OECD countries seem to have 
marked, at least in the crisis’s first stages, the “comeback” of the golden rules of the 
Keynesian policy (Keynes 1936; Barrère 1983; Creel et al. 2005). 
 
Nevertheless the actual effect of public spending on economic growth is both theoretically 
and empirically debated. Traditionally, the theory of market failures has justified State 
interventionism while the theory of State failures has rather insisted on the possible harmful 
effect of the State’s activity and expansion. The theoretical debate has given rise to a plethoric 
empirical literature and contradictory findings (Nijkamp and 2004) concerning the effect of 
government size, defined as the public expenditure as a share of total GDP, on economic 
growth. The relationship was initially studied in the framework of a linear model through a 
Cobb Douglas production function first developed by Feder (1982) and adapted by Ram 
(1986) (Dalamagas 2000, p.278). According to the area and the period studied, these studies 
and the following ones found opposite clear-cut effects, either positive or negative. But, in the 
wake of Grossman (1987, 1988), the empirical literature investigated the possibility of a non-
linear relationship, assuming that government size has a positive effect on growth but only to 
a certain extent. Similarly to the Laffer curve, this literature emphasized the existence of an 
inverted U-shaped curve between government size and GDP growth, sometimes called the 
Armey Curve (Armey et al. 1995), the Rahn Curve (Rahn 1999) or also the “BARS curve” 
referring to Barro (1989), Armey et al. (1995), Rahn (1996) and Scully (1994). The top of the 
                                                 
2 Public debt corresponds to the whole public loans contracted by all public administrations.  It encloses State 
debt, local community debt and social administrations’ debt (social security).  
3 Source: INSEE. 
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curve would supply the “optimal” government size in the sense of the size that maximizes 
GDP growth.  
 
Therefore, the debate shifted from the sign of the relation between government size and 
growth (either positive or negative) to the determination of the optimal government size. In 
the latter perspective, we tackle two main questions. First, how can we theoretically explain a 
non linear relationship between State size and economic growth? Second, is there a single 
State size that would maximize growth for all countries or a diversity of optimal sizes, 
depending on national and institutional determinants (Mueller 2003, p.546)? Concerning the 
first question, the literature on the Armey Curve suffers from a theoretical lack since no work 
provides a comprehensive explanation of the inverted U relationship between government size 
and economic growth. Most often, to justify the existence of an optimal State size, they 
merely refer to the theory of market failures that would clearly define the State’s prerogatives 
(natural monopoly, externalities…). As far as governments stick to their prerogatives, State 
size would be efficient, but beyond it, it would turn to be harmful for economic growth. 
However this explanation of government size optimality cannot properly account for the 
existence of State failures per se, which makes public intervention costly even within the 
frame of its prerogatives. That led us to propose a theoretical explanation of the Armey curve 
and State optimality applying the remediableness criterion (Williamson 2005), thus 
combining the costs (State failures) and the benefits (from correcting market failures) of 
public spending. 
 
Concerning the second question related to the diversity of the Armey curves, the latest 
empirical studies did not allow to provide a clear answer. They did not supply comparable 
results, mainly due to the fact that their observation periods widely diverged. While the 
studies on US, mainly on relative long periods, found an optimal size of around 20% 
(Grossman 1987, 1988; Peden 1991; Carlstrom et al. 1991; Scully 1994; Vedder et al 1998), 
the studies over other countries and especially European countries focused on very recent 
periods and established optimal rates closer to 30% (Chao and Gruber 1998; Afonso et al. 
2003; Pevcin 2004; Davis 2009; Forte and Magazzino 2010). These seemingly contrasting 
findings can hardly be compared because of too different observation periods. Indeed, the 
optimal rate seems to depend on the observation period and that is all the more true that the 
observation period is short (Mavrov 2007, p.59). Therefore it turns out to be necessary to have 
studies on long periods over other countries than US to know if their optimal State sizes, if 
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they exist, converge towards similar rates or if national disparities exist. The French case 
appeared to be much relevant for such a study because it provided one of the longest stable 
democratic periods to analyze, since the establishment of the Third republic in 1870. 
 
The main contribution of the present article is to provide a framework, through an accurate 
analysis of the existing literature and an articulation of the theories of State and market 
failures, for a better understanding of the inverted U-shape relationship between government 
size and GDP growth. This framework enables to account for the diversity of the optimal 
State sizes that would depend on both the market cultures and State (in)efficiency of the 
countries. The thesis of a diversity of the Armey curves is also supported by our empirical 
findings. Indeed, we first found robust evidence of the existence of a non-linear relationship 
between government activity and economic performance in France on one of the longest 
periods studied within this literature, 1871-2008. Then we empirically determine that the 
optimal State size on this period was 34% as a share of GDP, that is to say, much higher than 
the optimal level found in comparable long-time series studies on US. 
 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 explores the literature on the impact 
of public expenditure on economic performance. Section 3 develops a theoretical framework 
by articulating the theories of market failures and State failures to account for the existence of 
an inverted U-shaped relationship between government activity and GDP growth. Section 4 
provides empirical findings of the existence of such a relationship in France over long periods 
(1871-2008). Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Empirical literature 
The issue of the effect of government activity on economic outcomes has given rise to a 
plethoric empirical literature. The studies took many forms, testing the effect of total public 
expenditure or in a specific field (defense, education, infrastructure…), (marginal) tax rates or 
public debt on different economic outcomes such as GDP or GNP growth, total factor 
productivity or unemployment. Nijkamp and Poot (2004) provide a rather comprehensive 
meta-analysis of 93 studies performed until 1998 on the effects of total and specific public 
expenditure and tax rates on economic growth. They conclude that if the positive influence of 
public spending in education and public infrastructure is confirmed, it is much more difficult 
to reach an agreement on the effect of fiscal policy and total public spending as a percentage 
of the GDP. We propose here to focus on the effect of the latter kind of studies by providing a 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.77
5 
 
thorough analysis of the 41 articles of the meta-analysis dealing only with the effect of 
government size and by completing it with 23 extra studies on the topic, most often published 
after 1998 (Table 1 and 2). For a better understanding of the contradictory effects of 
government size on economic outcomes according to the different studies, we propose an in-
depth analysis of the periods and the panels of countries considered in each study. We also 
suggest to examine more deeply the form of the estimated model (linear or non-linear). 
Indeed, Nijkamp and Poot (2004) merely provided the sign (positive, negative or 
inconclusive) of the relationship without specifying the form of the equation that is tested. 
Thus, they could classify a study as inconclusive when it provided no evidence of a linear 
relationship but a strong non-linear relationship between government size and economic 
growth, as for Grossman (1987). Therefore, in our analysis, we add a fourth possible effect 
besides positive, negative and inconclusive, which is a non-linear one, which would describe 
an inverted U-shaped curve.  
 
Among the 64 studies of our sample, the huge majority, namely 47, tested only a linear 
relationship between government size and growth (table 1), while 17 tested a non-linear 
model (table 2). As we can see in table 1 that presents the results of the former kind of studies, 
64% (30) of them found a negative effect of government size, while only 11% (5) found the 
opposite effect and 25% (12) were inconclusive. This convergence towards a negative 
influence of government size becomes even more obvious when considering the studies, 
whether in cross-section or in time-series, which focused on developed, OECD countries. In 
fact 70% (19) of the studies upheld a negative effect, while only 7% (2) established a positive 
effect and 23% (6) found no relationship. The negative effect seems to be slightly less 
prominent for developing countries and in the studies that gather both kinds of countries. 
Indeed, concerning the developing countries, we list 60% (6) of the sample articles showing a 
negative effect, 20% (2) a negative one and 20% (2) an inconclusive effect. Likewise the 
cross-countries studies that focus on both developing and developed countries provided 
evidence of a negative effect in 50% (5) of the cases and a positive one in 10% (1) and no 
effect in 40% (4) of the articles. From these raw statistics, we can first suppose that the effects 
of a same government size slightly differ according to the development of the countries 
considered.  
 
 
Table 1. Studies estimating a linear model 
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 NEGATIVE EFFECT 
POSITIVE 
EFFECT INCONCLUSIVE 
OECD  
Countries 
(19) Ahmed (1986), Landau (1983),
Peden and Bradley (1989),  
Engen and Skinner (1992),  
Evans and Karras (1994),  
Hsieh and Lai (1994),  
Gallaway and Verder (1995),  
Karras (1997), Gwartney et al. (1998), 
Abrams (1999), 
Hansson and Henrekson (1999),  
Dalmagas (2000),  
Alesina and al. (1999),  
Bernholz (2000),  
Fölster and Henrekson (2001),  
Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001),  
Dar and Amirkhalkhali (2002) 
Illarionov and Pivarova (2002) 
Kustepeli (2005) 
(2) Bairan (1988), 
Macnair et al. (1995)
(6) Gemmell (1983),  
Saunders (1985),  
Levine and Renelt (1992), 
Sheeley (1993),  
Andres and al. (1996),  
Ghali (1999) 
Developping  
Countires 
(6) Landau (1985),  
Assane and Pourgerani (1994),  
Karikari (1995),  
Hanson and Hebrekson (1994),  
Guseh (1997),  
Zhang and Zou (1998) 
(2) Sattar (1993),  
Cooray (2008) 
(2) Cronovith (1998),  
Bairan (1990) 
Anaman (2004) 
OECD and  
developping  
countires 
(5) Rao (1989),  
Grier and Tullock (1989),  
Barro (1991),  
Lee (1995),  
Barro (1997) 
(1) Ram (1986) (4) Komendi and al. (1985), 
Scully (1990),  
Lin (1994),  
Lee and Lin (1994) 
Sources: articles published between 1983 and 1998 in refereed journals (Nijkamp and Poot, 2004, Table 2) and 
articles in bibliography. 
 
As all the 64 studies focused on a relatively recent period, namely the second half of the 20th 
century, except Ahmed (1986) whose observation period is 1908-1980. Thus we can assume 
that this apparent negative effect is valid only for this recent period. As this period 
corresponds to relatively high scope of government size, especially for the developed 
countries, we can also assume that this seemingly negative effect is true for relatively high 
share of public expenditure in national income. It is exactly what the small literature on the 
optimal size of government tends to show. We collected 17 papers estimating a non-linear 
relationship between government activity and its performance (table 2). According to the 
studies, the optimal size of government can vary from around 20% to 40% of GDP. The bulk 
of these studies are on the United-States and they tend to converge towards a 20% ratio 
(Grossman 1987, 1988; Peden 1991; Carlstrom et al. 1991; Scully 1994; Vedder et al 1998). 
Regarding other countries, the studies found most often higher optimal sizes such as 27% for 
Canada (Chao and Gruber 1998), 35% for 23 OECD countries (Afonso et al 2003), 40% in 
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low-income countries (Davis 2009), around 40% for European countries (Forte and 
Magazzino 2010, p.14; Pevcin 2004, p.105) and especially between 40% (Forte and 
Magazzino 2010, p.23) and 43% (Pevcin 2004, p.10) for France.  
 
These studies tend to comfort the global negative effect of government size in the second half 
of the 20th century, found in the “linear-relationship studies”. Indeed, most of the countries 
would be on the downward sloping portion of their inverted U-shaped curves during this 
period. This effect would be all the more negative as the study is on rich, OECD countries 
because they would have a lower optimal size.  
Table 2. Studies estimating a non-linear model 
AUTOR PERIOD PANEL OPTMAL SIZE 
Grossman (1987) 1929-1982 USA 19% 
Grossman (1988) 1929-1982 USA nc 
Peden (1991) 1929-1986 USA 20% 
Carlstrom and Gokhaie 
(1991) After-war USA nc 
Karras (1993) nc nc 20% 
Scully (1994) 1929-1989 USA 21.5-22.9% 
Karras (1996) 1960-1985 118 countries 23% 
Vedder and Gallaway (1998) 1947-1997 USA 17% 
Chao and Gruber (1998) 1929-1996 Canada 27% 
Scully (2000) 1995 
22 OECDE/112 
countries 20.2-22.3% 
Afonso et al. (2003) 1990-2000 23 OECD 35% 
Mavrov (2007) 1990-2004 Bulgaria 21.42 % 
Pevcin (2004) 1950-1996 12 EU countries 36-42% 
Magazzino (2008) 
1862-1998 
1950-1998 Italy 
23.06% 
32.83% 
Davis (2009) nc low-income countries 40% 
Chobanov and Mladenova 
(2009) 1970-2009 28 EU countries 25,00% 
Forte and Magazzino (2010) 1970-2009 27 EU countries 35.39-43.50% 
 
Table 2 also shows that the different studies on as specific country converge more or less 
toward similar but not identical optimal sizes. Even though the optimal sizes provided by the 
various studies can hardly be compared because of significant methodological differences, 
such as the models to assess and the observation periods, table 2 supplies us with a second 
                                                 
4 Forte and Magazzino (2010, p.23) found a 37% average optimal State size  for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and UK. 
5 Pevcin (2004) found a 36-43% optimal government size for 8 EU countries: Italy, France, Finland, Sweden, 
Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, and Belgium. 
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indication. There would be a diversity of Armey curves specific to each country. However 
neither the inverted U curve, nor the diversity of the curves is theoretically justified in the 
literature. That is what we propose in the next section. 
 
3. An Approach of the Optimal Government Size based on the State and Market 
Failures 
The inverted-U relationship between government activity and GDP Growth neither suggest 
that “all government is bad”, nor that “all government is good”. Government can have a 
positive influence on economic growth until a certain scope and beyond it, it can become 
harmful. Thus, an optimal size of government would exist (figure 1, G*).  
 
Figure1. Armey Curve 
 
 
Formally, the inverted-U relationship between public spending and economic growth can be 
represented as follows: 
 
GDP GROWTH = a + b G – c G², with b and c  > 0     (1) 
 
GDP GROWTH represents the real gross domestic product and G the size of government. The 
positive sign on the G term shows the beneficial effects of government spending on output 
(Vedder and Gallaway 1998, p.4). It refers to the positive effect from correcting market 
failures. On the contrary, the negative coefficient associated with the G² term measures the 
%∆Y 
Size of public sector 
0 G* 1.0 
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adverse effects of an increase in government size. Beyond the optimal state size, G*, the 
squared term (cG²) increases in value faster than the linear term (bG). In other words, a low 
level of public expenditure as share of GDP has a positive effect on economic growth, while 
high rates of public expenditure have a negative effect.  
 
Traditionally, the inverted-U relationship between government size and economic growth is 
explained by the combination of the theories of State and market failures (Grosman 1988, 
p.195, Vedder and Gallaway 1998, p.2) that account for both the positive and negative effects 
of government activity.  
 
Table 3: Market Failure (s) versus State Failure (s) 
 
Market Failure (s) State Failure (s) 
I Microeconomic level 
Public Good (Lindhal-Samuelson) 
Monopole 
Externalities 
Asymmetric information (Stiglitz) 
Under production of public good (free rider) 
Cognitive dissonance  
(Akerlof and Dickens, 1983) 
 
 
 
 
 
Transaction cost  
(Coase 1960, Arrow 1970, Williamson, 2005)
 
II Macroeconomic level 
Market instability and  
State stabilization policy (Keynes) 
Equity, growth and redistribution of income 
(distributive justice) 
I Microeconomic level 
State failure as democratic failures 
No optimality of provision of public goods: 
Median voter, Majority Cycle,  
Agency problem (Shirking literature) 
Over production of public good: Bureaucracy 
Cognitive dissonance (Brady and al. 1995) 
 
State failure per se or Inefficiency 
1. Public versus private 
(Mueller, 2003, Chapter 22) 
2. Derived externalities (Hayek, Ikeda 1994) 
3. Failures of political learning process 
4. Political transaction cost (Dixit, 1998) and 
cost of rent seeking 
 
II Macroeconomic level 
State instability: political cycle  
(Austrian Business Cycle) 
Procedural justice 
 
The positive effect of public spending is explained by the benefits from correcting market 
failure (Coase 1960, p.16; Arrow 1970, p.69; Cullis and Jones 1987; Williamson 2005; 
Hillman 2009, pp.16-23) (Table 3). The negative effect is explained by the costs inherent to 
State failure (Wolf 1979, 1988; Krueger 1990; Le Grand 1991; Evangelopoulos 2007; Brady 
et al. 1995; Boettke et al. 2007; Munger 2008). Our first contribution to the theory of 
inverted-U shaped relationship is to show that the Armey Curve or BARS Curve is the 
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combination of two curves related to the market and the states failures (Figure 2, MF and SF 
curves). 
 
The MF curve describes the positive effect of public spending with a decreasing marginal 
productivity (Figure 2). The positive effect of public spending is the gains associated with the 
correction of market failures. The law of diminishing returns explains its slope. The slope is 
also explained by the fact that when there is no more market, there are no longer market 
failures. This double effect explains the shape of the curve of the benefits from correcting the 
market failures. Therefore public spending has a positive impact on economic growth, but 
with a decreasing marginal effect. The benefits from correcting market failures explain the 
rising phase of the Armey curve.  
 
The theory of market failures is a theory of the optimal size and structure of public spending 
because, like in the Adam Smith’s minimal State (Smith 1737/1937, Book, IV, Chapter X, 
p.651), the theory of public goods, externalities, natural monopoly and asymmetric 
information, precisely gives the natures and the qualities of public goods that should be 
provided to achieve the first best optimum, that is to say the optimal allocations of scarce 
resources. Thus why not to stick to this explanation of the optimal size and why is the Armey 
Curve not always increasing? The answer is to be found on the side of the two definitions of 
the concept of State failure.  
 
The SF curve describes the negative effect of public spending with an increasing marginal 
effect (Figure 2). The theory of State failure explains both the non optimality of government 
size and the negative effect of public spending on GDP growth rate. We can first speak about 
State failures when the public choice resulting from the democratic process does not manage 
to optimally correct market failures, on the one hand, because the preferences of the median 
voter are different from the optimal level and, on the other hand, because of the existence of 
complex agency relationship between voters, politicians and bureaucrats (Imai 2009; Downs 
1960; Hillman 2009, p.84-89, Table 1).  
 
There are also State failures per se, since, as Williamson and a part of the public choice theory 
put it, the benefits and the costs of every public choice should always be compared according 
to the remediableness criterion (Williamson 2005). The costs of public spending come from 
crowding-out effect (Bastiat 1983, p.93), effects of tax on market transaction costs, activities 
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of rent seeking (Hillman 2009, pp.84-100), political transaction costs (Dixit 1998) and 
bureaucratic additional costs (Dunleavy 1991; Sarte 2001; Ayal and Karras 1996). The 
political transaction costs describe the displacement costs, for instance, of one euro in private 
safety to public education.  One euro in public education is desirable because it enhances 
welfare and the productivity of inputs (positive externality). Nevertheless, under certain 
conditions, the gains from displacements may not compensate its costs i.e. the political 
transaction costs. Government cannot spend money without extracting money from someone. 
There exists political transaction costs because political contracts are rarely between two 
clearly identifiable contractors; they have multiple parties (voters or lobbyists) and contract 
can rarely be as efficient as on market (Dixit 1998, pp.48-49). Political transaction costs are 
the cost of organizing a pressure group, lobbying, contributing to campaign, seeking votes and 
paying bribes (Benson 1984, p.390). Political exchange like voluntary exchange is costly. In 
addition to these two costs from correcting market failures, there is a relative inefficiency. 
Therefore the costs of public spending describe the declining part of the Armey curve.  
 
However the fact that the costs of public spending on economic growth increase at an 
increasing rate is more original in view of the related literature (Figure 2, SF curve). We 
supply here four reasons to explain the slope of the SF curve (Figure 2).  
 
-1- The Crowding-out effect increases more than proportionally with the size of government, 
because Welfare State affects the entrepreneurs' productive activity by increasing its 
opportunity cost (Lippman and al. 2005, p.23). 
 
-2- There is also a systemic crowding-out effect. Market prices solve the knowledge-dispersal 
problem. They transmit already known information and contribute to the process of the 
formation of opinion (Hayek 1949, pp. 96-106; Kirzner 1984, p.204). Then competition in 
market process is a discovery procedure. The inefficiency of market is not always a problem, 
because entrepreneurs perceive in the inefficiencies the opportunities to rearrange the pattern 
of input utilization or output consumption and to correct their expectation errors (Kirzner 
1978, 1985, p.138) i.e. the opportunities for pure entrepreneurial profit. Public spending to 
correct market failures deprives the members of solutions that market process would have 
discovered. We can speak about a systemic crowding-out effect because it can reduce both 
economic knowledge available on the market and the number of participants.  
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-3- The political transaction costs increase more than proportionally with the size of 
government because the displacement costs inside the public sector increase with the 
competition between the various interest groups. The intensity of competition increases with 
the size of government because public resources become scare. The pro-education groups or 
the pro-safety ones spend more to obtain the marginal euro.   
 
-4- The bureaucratic wastes rise more than proportionally with the size of government. It 
results from systemic crowding-out effect since the tax replaces the price. There is no 
economic calculation. Nobody knows the value of goods and services. The structure of 
expenditure has no economic justification but is only based on political reasons. 
 
So the U-inverted curve is the total effect of public spending, i.e. the combination of the 
benefits from correcting market failures (Figure 2, Curve MF) and the costs of State failure 
(Figure 2, Curve SF).  Figure 2 summarizes our theoretical justification of the non-linear 
relationship between economic growth and government scope. 
 
Before G*, the marginal benefits from correcting market failure are higher than the marginal 
costs. In a world without government, the level of public spending is nil and the GDP growth 
rate would be Ya (Figure 2). GDP growth rate is not necessarily nil. In some cases, anarchy 
could be sustainable (Friedman 1989; Stringham 2005; Leeson 2007). When the State 
emerges, the monopoly of violence creates both social peace and a risk of legal predation 
(North, Wallis and Weingast 2005, p.10). In a world without any government, output per 
capita is low because there is no rule of law (North and Thomas 1973; Cowen 1992). Anarchy 
is the order of violence in which everyone can steal the assets of weaker persons with 
impunity. In this world, there is little incentive to save and to invest in productive activities. 
The skills move towards unproductive activities because the threat of predation is credible and 
constant. Without government, “predatory groups will impose themselves on people by force 
and create government to extract income and wealth” (Holcombe 2004, p.326). Without a 
government monopoly over the use of violence, competing groups can cooperate and collude 
to exercise coercion, giving birth to a collusive anarchy (Cowen 1992, p.261). Public 
spending appears here and has a positive effect on economic growth. The theory of market 
failure and more generally of anarchy failure (Cowen 1992) explains why between 0 and G*, 
public spending has a positive effect at an increasing rate (Figure 2, C).  
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Figure 2. Relationship between growth and government size: a decomposition of the  
Armey Curve 
 
 
Beyond G*, the difference between benefits and costs decreases to become negative. Welfare 
enhancing through public spending is not necessarily desirable because public spending 
becomes too costly. These costs may exceed the benefits from correcting market failures. If 
the size of government remained at G*, the growth rate of GDP is maximized. So the Armey 
curve theory is both positive and normative. It also supplies governments with an accurate 
size if they want to reach the highest production possibility frontier. 
 
Finally our decomposition of the Armey curve can be presented as a synthesis of the whole 
theoretical works on the effects of public expenditure on growth and more generally on the 
consequences of public intervention. This decomposition also enables us to provide some 
possible explanations of the diversity of the Armey Curves, via the shapes of the benefits (MF 
curve) and costs curves (SF curve). Each country has its market and State cultures. The public 
spending costs vary according to the level of bureaucratic inefficiency, the willingness to pay 
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Public Spending Costs, (SF) 
Benefit from 
Correcting Market 
Failures (MF) 
G* Size of State 
%∆Y 
C 
B 
GDP Growth in Anarchy, Ya
benefits=costs
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.77
14 
 
tax and the institutions via their consequences on the level of political transaction costs. 
Inversely, the more market price works, the lower the benefits from correcting its failures.  
 
4. Empirical evidence of the optimal government size in France (1871-2008) 
 
4.1 Economic growth and government size in France: an historical background 
In the empirical section, we try to determine the nature of the relationship between 
government size and GDP growth in France since 1871. The French case is particularly 
interesting because, since the establishment of the Third Republic in 1870 and the Constituent 
Assembly election one year later, France adopted a stable republican regime, except for 
WWII, with a relatively high permanence of its political institutions. Therefore it offers a long 
period relevant for a time-series analysis. Since 1871, the French GDP growth presented 
numerous variations (see figure 3) marked by production long cycles and the different wars, 
against Prussia (1870-1871), World War 1 and World War 2 (table 4) (See the endnote for 
more information on the French growth)i. 
 
Figure 3. French GDP growth rate (1871-2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Production long cycles 
 
 
 
During the same period, the government followed a general upward trend from 1871 to 2008 
except a brief decrease between 1917 and 1930 (see figure 4 and table 5). A closer look 
enables us to confirm Florio and Colautti (2005, p.379) who observed that the French 
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government size followed an S-shaped curve over the whole period (figure 4). But while they 
found that the stabilisation period occurred during the 1970s, our data shows that public 
expenditure as a share of GDP has remained stable since only the early 1990s. In spite of this 
recent period of stabilisation, France has one of the highest ratio of expenditure over national 
income among the OECD countries (55.8% in 2009). The ratio stood at around 15% in the 
first decade of the 19th century. In the early 1990s, public spending represented more than the 
half of the national wealth produced in a year (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. The annual share of government spending in GDP in France (1871-2008) 
 
 
Table 5. Government size cycles in France in the long run (1871-2008) 
1872-1914 1917-1930 1930-1993 1993-2008 
Stability 
(10%-15%) 
Decrease 
(35%-20%) 
Increase 
(30%-55%) 
Stability 
(50-55%) 
 
The main driver of this increase has been the rapid growth in social protection spending 
(Social Security) due to structural factors, especially population ageing: this latter trend is 
expected to continue, looking to 2050 (Beynet and Naerhuysen 2007, p.1). The debt service 
charge has also increased in line with the rise of public debt. Operating expenses have 
remained stable as a percentage of GDP (Beynet and Naerhuysen 2007, p.2). 
 
The point is now to estimate the relationship between government size and economic growth. 
The raw data yields a first look into this question. Indeed, by performing a basic regression of 
the average growth rate by decade on the average size of the government by decade from 
1930, when public spending started to steadily increase, we can observe a inverted U curve 
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with an optimal size located between 35% and 40% (Figure 5). However, this insight could be 
entirely spurious. 
 
Figure 5. Growth and government size in France (1930-2009) (10 year mean) 
 
 
4.2 Empirical strategy and test 
 
4.2.1 Data. This first stylised fact needs a deeper examination through an appropriate 
econometric approach. We chose to assess an alternative model between the traditional one of 
a Cobb Douglas production function and the basic model of the empirical literature on the 
Armey Curve. The former presents the advantage of being comprehensive but considers only 
a linear relationship and includes variables that can depend on government activity such as 
capital or labour investments. Moreover it is said to present important limitations (Bairam 
1990, p. 1427; Chobanov and Mladenova 2009; Hill 2008). The latter, while allowing to 
assess a non-linear relationship, is suspiciously free from control variables. That is why we 
went for a quadratic model with the standard variables of the literature on the effect of public 
expenditure.  
 
In our model, the dependant variable is the annual French GDP (GDP_FR) provided by 
Maddison’s website6. The main dependant variable is the size of government (GSIZE), 
expressed by the share of total public expenditure (Central State, social protection and local 
                                                 
6 Maddison’s website (http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm): Historical Statistics of the World 
Economy:  1-2008 AD- Table 2: GDP levels-France GDP in million 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars 
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public authorities) as a share of total GDP. This variable was built by linking the series of 
Bourguignon and Levy-Leboyer (1985) and André and Delorme (1983, 1993). The possibility 
of exogenous chock is taken into account with the external growth that is approximated in our 
case by the annual GDP of 11 European traditional trade partners (GDP_EU) stemming from 
Maddison’s website7. As a complement, we add a traditional explicative variable of the 
literature on the growth-expenditure relationship (Bairam 1990; Dalamagas 2000), which is 
the degree of openness of the economy (OPEN) that corresponds to the share of the 
exportation plus the importation as a percentage of total GDP, coming from Asselain and 
Blancheton (2005). We also consider the national level of employment (EMPLOY) supposed 
to control for economic cycles, according to Grossman (1987) and Vedder and Gallaway 
(1998) who control for unemployment rate. This variable, stemming from Bourlies et al. 
(2010), measures the average number of workers per year in France. We also include in our 
model a variable measuring the level of total tax rate (TAX), available on Piketty’s website8, 
enabling to look at the effect on growth of a change in expenditure holding taxes constant. 
Finally, we include a standard variable measuring the French total population (POP), coming 
from Maddison’s website9. The presentation of the variables is given in appendix with tables 
A.1 (definition and source), A.2 (descriptive statistics) and A.3 (correlation matrix) in 
appendix. 
 
In a first step, we estimate with an OLS method a linear model through the following equation 
by excluding two periods, [1914-1919] and [1939-1946], which correspond to the war periods 
and for which the data on public expenditure are not available. This model is given by 
equation (2). Then, to test an inverted U-shaped relationship between government size and 
GDP growth, we estimate a quadratic model represented by equation (3), by adding the 
squared variable of government size into equation (2): 
 
Ln(GDP_FRt) = C + a1 Ln(GSIZEt) + a2 Ln(GDP_EUt) + a3 Ln(OPENt) + a4 Ln(EMPLOYt ) 
+  
                                                 
7 Maddison’s website (http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm): Historical Statistics of the World 
Economy:  1-2008 AD- Table 2: GDP levels-GDP Total 11 Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United-Kingdom), million 1990 
International Geary-Khamis dollars. 
8 Piketty’s website (http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/fichiers/public/Grasset2001/Livre/TabChap1.xls) 
9 Maddison’s website (http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm): Historical Statistics of the World 
Economy:  1-2008 AD- Table 1. 
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a5 Ln(TAXt) + a6 Ln(POPt) + εt        
 (2) 
 
Ln(GDP_FRt) = C + α1 Ln(GSIZEt) + α2 Ln(GSIZEt)² + α3 Ln(GDP_EUt) + α4 Ln(OPENt) +                       
α5 Ln(EMPLOYt ) + α6 Ln(TAXt) + α7 Ln(POPt) + εt     
 (3) 
 
With GDP_FR representing the French annual GDP, GSIZE the annual size of government, 
GDP_EU the European annual GDP, OPEN the annual degree of openness of the national 
economy, EMPLOY the annual level of total employment, TAX the average annual level of tax 
rate, POP the total population, ε an error term, C a constant. 
 
4.2.2 Preliminary Tests. As we deal with macroeconomic variables over time, the possibility 
of spurious regression results due to common trends or nonstationarity of the data arises. First, 
supposing that all the variables are I(1), we first tested for cointegration between 
Ln(GDP_FR), Ln(GSIZE) and Ln(GSIZE)², by regressing the former on the latters. But the 
residuals of this regression did not turn out be stationary, what indicates the absence of a long-
term relationship. Then, we make sure of the stationarity of our series and, in case of non-
stationarity, remove the deterministic component from the series. After having implemented 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron unit root tests on the logarithm of our 
variables, we found that all of them are integrated of order 1, I(1) except Ln(GSIZE) that is 
I(0). Therefore we took in the following regressions the first differences of our variables 
except the latter.  
 
Secondly we accounted for the possibility that public expenditure takes time to translate into 
economic growth rates when using the lag structure. We included separately in the baseline 
regression the lagged variables of GSIZE and we kept the lag length that minimizes the 
Akaike’s Information Criterion, which turned out to be the t-1 lagged variable. Moreover, t-
tests require normality of the error terms. If normality does not hold, the t-distribution does 
not apply. Therefore, all the following regressions include annual dummies to control for the 
outliers and to allow to pass the Jarque-Bera test. In table 5, 6 and 7, we report the Jarque-
Bera test statistics and p-values for the residuals series. Finally, a Box-Pierce test is also 
systematically performed to make sure of the absence of serious auto-correlation of the error 
terms. For indication, we also report the Durbin-Watson (DW) test statistics in the tables. 
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4.2.3 Causality. Although we use the lagged variable of government size, we do not totally 
get rid of the difficulty inherent to the literature on the expenditure-growth relation, to identify 
the sense of the causality. It is supposed to be especially the case of cross-section analyses 
because of “pooled estimates of the effects of government size on economic growth” (Ghali 
1999). Indeed, a significant coefficient can be interpreted as causality from economic growth 
to government size, according to the Wagner’s Law that supposes that as a society becomes 
more developed, the proportion of public spending to total output tends to rise. However, in 
our case, after having performed Granger Causality tests, we found a clear one-way effect 
from our variable of government size to GDP growth. Indeed, the tests show that we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that “GDP Growth does not Granger cause Government Size” while we 
can reject the hypothesis according to which “Government Size does not Granger cause GDP 
Growth”10. 
 
4.3 Results 
 In a first battery of tests, we estimate with an OLS method a linear relationship between 
French growth and government size, namely equation (2). The results are given in table 6. We 
estimate this relation in two steps: by first adding the control variables related to the European 
growth and the economy openness, available on the whole period 1871-2008, and then by 
including the other variables concerning the level of employment, tax rates and population, 
available on shorter periods. The Box-Pierce test indicates the presence of autocorrelation, up 
to a maximum lag, only for the first regression (column 1). Indeed, at the 0.95 confidence 
level, the null hypothesis (no serial correlation) cannot be accepted. Therefore we reestimate it 
by including a first-order autoregressive disturbance term (AR1). We first notice from table 6 
that the control variables have overall the expected effects when they reach significance. The 
variable approximating the European growth appears as the most significant variable to 
explain French growth, being systematically significant at 1% level, while the degree of 
openness of France is neither significant on the whole period studied (column 1) nor when 
including other control variables (column 3). 
 
                                                 
10 The test shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis that “GDP Growth does not Granger cause Government 
Size” (F-stat = 0.39) while we can reject the hypothesis according to which “Government Size does not Granger 
cause GDP Growth” (F-stat’ = 1.95). When increasing the lag length, for instance with 8 lags, the causality 
becomes even more obvious with (F-stat = 1.36; F-stat’ = 3.97). 
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Table 6. Regression Results. Estimation of a linear relation between government size and 
economic growth, 1971-2008 - Heteroskedastic Newey-West correction 
 
Dependant 
Variable 
1 2 3 
Δ(LN_GDP_FR) 
Constant -0.031*** (3.178) 
-0.017 
(0.899) 
0.017 
(0.786) 
LN_GSIZE(t-1) 0.007*** (2.719) 
0.006 
(1.229) 
-0.006 
(1.044) 
Δ(LN_GDP_EU) 1.194*** (8.160) 0.839*** (6.617) 0.628*** (5.080) 
Δ(LN_OPEN) -0.037 (0.723) 0.114*** (2.797) 0.049 (1.289) 
Δ(LN_EMPLOY)   1.553*** (4.107) 
Δ(LN_TAX(t-1))   0.164** (2.270) 
Δ(LN_POP)   1.389*** (2.882) 
AR adjustement  
(order) 1 / / 
Observations 120 97 97 
Adj. R² 0.504 0.736 0.681 
Durbin-Watson  
stat 1.797 1.937 1.860 
Jarque-Bera  
stat 5.160 5.302 4.600 
Jarque-Bera  
p-value 0.075 0.070 0.100 
Note: Absolute value of Newey-West t-statistic in brackets; * significant at 10 percent; ** 
significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1% 
 
Concerning the government size variable, it turns out to have a significant and positive effect 
on economic growth on the whole period (column 1) but the relationship is not stable as 
showed by a Cusum of Squares Test (see figure A.1 in appendix). It appears obvious when 
performing the same regression on a shorter period 1896-2008 (column 2) and when including 
additional control variables (column 3), since government size stops being significant. 
Therefore estimating a linear model does not enable us to uphold the thesis of a relationship 
between public spending and economic growth. 
 
Our theoretical prediction leads us to estimate in a second battery of regressions a quadratic 
model in which we add the squared variable of government size. The results are supplied in 
table 7 and speak volume. Indeed, the variable representing government size has a positive 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.77
21 
 
and significant impact on economic growth while the squared value has a significant and 
negative effect in the four regressions of table 6. This result is valid with the short version of 
our model on the whole period 1871-2008 (column 1) and also when adding, one by one, the 
other control variables of the whole model on the shorter period 1896-2008 (columns 2, 3 and 
4). Therefore this second set of tests gives credit to our hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between the size of government and economic growth on long periods in France. 
In other words, the Armey curve is verified for France since 1871. That enables us to 
decompose the total and marginal effects of government activity.  
 
If we first focus on the total effect, the coefficients of table 8 allow to say that government 
expenditure has globally had a positive impact on economic activity in France. In fact, a 1% 
increase in public spending as a share of GDP has entailed in average a 0.17% point increase 
in GDP growth on the whole period studied (calculation based on the coefficients, α1 and α2, 
of LN_GSIZE(t-1) and LN_GSIZE(t-1)² of column 1 table 6)11. However if we look into the 
marginal effect of government activity, the conclusion is more contrasted. It appears from the 
coefficients of the four regressions of table 7 that the maximizing GDP growth government 
size is around 29-30% (exp (-α1/2α2)) and has been continuously exceeded since 1947. 
Therefore, the marginal effect of an increase in government size was positive until the end of 
WW2 and became negative since 1950 when the actual ratio was higher than 30% on an 
ongoing basis. Therefore our empirical finding provides us with good reasons to uphold that 
government size in 2008 was higher by around 20% point than the growth maximizing size. It 
also appears that, like most other industrialized nations, France would be on the downward 
sloping portion of its inverted U-shaped curve. If France would have kept a government size 
close to the ratio of 30%, it would have experienced in average for the period 2000-2008, an 
annual growth rate of 3.23% instead of the 1.93% actual rate, which represents a significant 
loss of 1.9% point of growth per year. We also performed a set of robustness checks by 
mainly controlling for the effect of political variables in the restrained model on the whole 
period and in the whole model on the shorter period 1896-2008. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 If we consider the coefficients α1 and α2 of columns 2, 3 and 4 of tables 7, the increase seems to have been 
higher, from 0.20% to 0.23% point. 
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Table 7. Regression Results. Estimation of a non-linear relation between Government Size 
and economic growth - Heteroskedastic Newey-West correction 
 
Dependant 
Variable 
1 2 3 4 
Δ(LN_GDP_FR) 
Constant -0.381*** (2.835) 
-0.525*** 
(3.781) 
-0.458*** 
(3.211) 
-0.478*** 
(3.23) 
LN_GSIZE(t-1) 0.237*** (2.763) 
0.326*** 
(3.740) 
0.287*** 
(3.256) 
0.296*** 
(3.204) 
LN_GSIZE(t-1)² -0.035*** (2.693) 
-0.048*** 
(3.697) 
-0.043*** 
(3.282) 
-0.044*** 
(3.204) 
Δ(LN_GDP_EU) 0.712*** (5.034) 0.580*** (4.550) 0.704*** (6.941) 0.681*** (7.343) 
Δ(LN_OPEN) 0.124*** (2.837) 0.099** (2.275) 0.110*** (2.652) 0.110*** (2.669) 
Δ(LN_EMPLOY)  1.054*** (3.257) 1.105*** (2.477) 1.063*** (3.258) 
Δ(LN_TAX(t-1))   0.209*** (3.812) 0.192*** (3.257) 
Δ(LN_POP)    0.377 (0.804) 
Observations 123 104 97 97 
Adj. R² 0.735 0.737 0.779 0.801 
Durbin-Watson  
stat 1.972 2.110 1.870 1.907282 
Jarque-Bera  
stat 4.761 4.718 5.340 2.275 
Jarque-Bera  
p-value 0.092 0.094 0.069 0.320 
Note: Absolute value of t statistic in brackets; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 
percent; *** significant at 1% 
 
The results are supplied in table 8. We first control for the change in the political institutions 
inherent to each Republic12, by including dummy variables the 3rd, 4th and 5th Republics. That 
has no impact on the relationship between government activity and economic growth (column 
1 and 4). 
 
                                                 
12 France adopted de facto in September 1870 a stable parliamentary republic with the third Republic (1870-
1940), during which the National Assembly is split in an Upper Chamber, the Senate and a Lower Chamber, the 
House of Deputies, the sole institution elected by direct universal suffrage. This bicameralism system 
characterizes the working of the French democracy until now, except a brief interruption with the Vichy Regime 
(1940-1944). The Fourth Republic (1946-1958) is in the continuation of the previous Republic with roughly the 
same working of institutions while under the Fifth Republic (since 1958), the Parliament is composed of the 
National Assembly that becomes the Lower Chamber and the Senate, moreover a president is elected by 
universal suffrage. 
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Table 8. Regression Results. Robustness checks - Heteroskedastic Newey-West correction 
 
Dependant 
Variable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Δ(LN_GDP_FR) 
Constant -0.375*** (2.759) 
-0.384*** 
(2.840) 
-0.296** 
(2.197) 
-0.389*** 
(2.760) 
-0.487*** 
(3.238) 
-0.500*** 
(3.396) 
LN_GSIZE(t-1) 0.236*** (2.880) 
0.239*** 
(2.767) 
0.197** 
(2.341) 
0.221** 
(2.462) 
0.302*** 
(3.205) 
0.308*** 
(3.346) 
LN_GSIZE(t-1)² -0.035*** (2.862) 
-0.035*** 
(2.699) 
-0.030** 
(2.351) 
-0.031** 
(2.251) 
-0.045*** 
(3.199) 
-0.046*** 
(3.336) 
Δ(LN_GDP_EU) 0.700*** (4.692) 0.707*** (4.925) 0.728*** (5.090) 0.715*** (8.002) 0.675*** (7.017) 0.676*** (7.274) 
Δ(LN_OPEN) 0.124*** (2.726) 0.127*** (2.831) 0.116** (2.624) 0.111*** (2.869) 0.114*** (2.707) 0.111*** (2.723) 
Δ(LN_EMPLOY)    1.041*** (3.228) 1.072*** (3.212) 1.072*** (3.245) 
Δ(LN_TAX(t-1))    0.183*** (3.538) 0.192*** (3.192) 0.195*** (3.273) 
Δ(LN_POP)    0.925 (1.317) 0.363 (0.805) 0.436 (0.846) 
REPUBLICS YES   YES   
ELECT  0.003 (0.801)   
0.002 
(0.749)  
IDEOLOGY   -0.020 (1.449)   
0.005 
(0.564) 
Observations 123 123 123 97 97 97 
Adj. R² 0.731 0.734 0.719 0.806 0.800 0.799 
Durbin-Watson  
stat 1.971 1.981 2.077 2.051 1.926 1.913 
Jarque-Bera  
stat 4.326 4.163 5.118 1.385 2.449 2.204 
Jarque-Bera  
p-value 0.114 0.124 0.077 0.500 0.293 0.332 
Note: Absolute value of t statistic in brackets; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 
percent; *** significant at 1% 
 
Then, to consider the potential effect of electoral cycles, we include a dummy variable coded 
1 for all the election years of the lower Chamber of the Parliament because during the 
majority of our observation period, it is the sole institution elected by direct universal 
suffrage. But this variable leaves the coefficients of the government size variable unchanged 
(column 2 and 5). Finally we use a variable of political ideology of Facchini and Melki (2011) 
which measures the share of left-wing seats in parliament. While this variable does not reach 
significance, its introduction noticeably decreases the coefficients and significance of both 
government size variables (column 3). According to Facchini and Melki (2011), that can be 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.77
24 
 
explained by the fact that political ideology has an indirect effect on GDP through public 
spending. Therefore the former and the latter are correlated, as we can see on table A.3. But, 
the inverted U-relationship between government size and economic growth proves to be 
robust and an optimal size between 28 and 29% can be confirmed. 
 
4.4 Discussion 
Rather than merely supplying yet another evidence of the existence of the Armey curve for an 
additional country or period, it is interesting to know if our result is consistent with the related 
empirical literature. The aim is actually to understand, in the light of our finding, the diversity 
of sometimes contradictory results of the studies on the relationship between government size 
and economic performance. We can first notice that our finding of a 30% growth maximizing 
ratio is oddly significantly higher than the usual 20% ratio found in the studies on US 
(Grossman 1987, 1988; Peden 1991; Carlstrom and Gokhaie 1991; Scully 1994; Vedder and 
Gallaway 1998). It also appears that the French State reached its optimal scope later than in 
US, around 15 years later. Indeed, for instance, Grossman (1987) located the reversal point in 
the mid-1930s, compared to the late 1940s for France. That leads us to wonder whether these 
differences are due to a methodological bias or at least methodological divergences among the 
studies or rather to a French or an European originality. 
 
A first possibility is that the optimal point of government scope is underestimated in the 
studies on US because of too short observations periods that do not contain many 
observations with a government size below the optimal one found. Indeed, by starting the 
study after the 1930s, i.e. after the occurrence of the optimal point, as is the case for Vedder 
and Gallaway (1998) who started their study in 1947, or only a few years before, in 1929, as 
is the case for Grossman (1987), Peden (1991) and Scully (1994), not enough observations 
before the optimal size are taken into account. Mueller (2003, p.546) already emphasized that 
“some caution must be exercised in accepting Peden’s [and others’] estimate of optimal 
government size, given the very few observations [they] had when the government was 
smaller than 17 % of national income.” By contrast, in our study, the government size is 
systematically under its optimal size until at least the end of WW1, what gives serious 
grounds for thinking that the French optimal government size would be around 30%. 
 
However a second possibility is that it does exist a diversity of Armey curves and thus of 
optimal State sizes according to the countries considered or more generally the institutional 
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patterns. Indeed, while, the studies on US, whether biased or not, tend to reach a consensus on 
a low optimal size, the studies on other countries, with similar biases, tend to converge 
towards much higher sizes. Indeed, our finding is consistent with the studies on different 
panels of countries (Chao and Gruber 1998; Tanzi and Schuknecht 1996; Afonso et al 2003; 
Davis 2009) and especially on the EU countries whose optimal size would be between 37% 
(Forte and Magazzino 2010, p.1)13 and around 40% (Pevcin 2004, p.10)14 and more precisely 
on France with an optimal ratio between 40% (Forte and Magazzino 2010, p.23) and 43% 
(Pevcin 2004, p.10). Therefore it does appear that a relatively high optimal government size 
would be a European specific feature compared to US and does not result only from different 
observation periods.  
 
However our result of a 30% ratio also contrasts with the above 40% ratio of the other studies 
on France. But, in this case too, this divergence probably stems from the shorter observation 
periods of the other studies. Indeed, Forte and Magazzino (2010) start their analysis in 1970, 
that is to say around 20 years after the occurrence of the optimal size, while Pevcin (2004) 
starts its in 1950, thus having a very few observations before the peak of the Armey curve. 
With our long time-series analysis, we can reasonably be confident in a 30% optimal size for 
the French State. It turns out that the shorter the observation period, the more the optimal 
point is sensible to the inclusion or exclusion of observations. It is for instance the case in the 
study of Mavrov (2007, p.58) who estimates that the optimal size for the Bulgarian State is 
21% on the very short period 1990-200415. 
 
In spite of the potential biases inherent to the various observation periods, the convergence of 
the empirical findings on different optimal State sizes according to the county studied tends to 
invalidate the thesis of a single inverted U-shaped relationship between government size and 
growth for all countries. Besides the consensus of the empirical findings of a relatively low 
optimal ratio in US, close to 20%, it emerges another trend of the empirical literature towards 
a higher optimal ratio of at least 30% for Europe. The stakes are now to know what the 
determinants of the optimal government size are. A first intuition was that the variety of 
government activity effects and optimal scales in terms of economic growth was probably due 
                                                 
13 Forte and Magazzino (2010, p.23) found a 37% average optimal State size  for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and UK. 
14 Pevcin (2004) found a 36-43% optimal government size for 8 EU countries: Italy, France, Finland, Sweden, 
Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, and Belgium. 
15 Mavrov (2007, p.59):  “For example, 2 years smaller period increase optimal size to 22,5% and 3 years – to 
25%. The same result is possible under increasing the period.” 
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to “different political environments, different spending histories, and different patterns of 
change in non-observable variables, such as the pace and pattern of innovation” (Vedder and 
Gallaway 1998; Mueller 2003, p.549). But the literature also provided observable factors such 
as the level of economic development (Mueller 2003, p.549; Forte and Magazzino 2010, 
p.2316) and more particularly prerequisite in terms of literacy and education, political 
institutions (political instability, distortionary regulation) and cultural environments (Barro 
1990). In one of the latest advancements on the Armey Curve, Forte and Magazzino (2010, 
p.39) investigated two potential determinants could be the national tradition of Welfare State 
and the flexibility of the labour market17. But the most important determinant of the shape of 
the Armey curve stays the national economic development. As a proof, in a comprehensive 
study with cross-country and time-series analyses for 115 “market economies” on the period 
1960-1980, Ram (1986, p.191) found an overall positive effect of government size on 
growth18 but a closer look reveals that this effect does not empirically hold for the 8 most 
developed countries19 of his panel. 
 
The fact remains, however, that a better understanding of the Armey Curve and its 
determinants allows to ensure (a bit) consistency among the numerous and contradictory 
studies on the effect of public expenditure on economic activity. The existence of an Armey 
curve that would be peculiar to each country or each institutional design enables us to 
understand why the empirical findings depend much on both the observation period and the 
counties studied. The period is decisive because, by focusing on a rather short one, the huge 
majority of the studies focus either on the rising or the declining portion of the curve, most 
often on the declining one since they study recent periods. By the way, they can account for a 
global negative effect with a linear model. But the studies often omit to specify that the effect 
they find is valid only for a narrow specific size of government contrary to Peden and Bradley 
                                                 
16 Forte and Magazzino (2010, p.23): “It is also interesting to note that the level of the peak of the BARS curve, 
on balance, increases with the increase of the per capita GDP, confirming the theoretical thesis that for countries 
who are in the former stages of economic development, the ratio of public expenditure to GDP needs to be 
higher than for the countries with high per capita GDP, because of the presence of indivisibilities in the supply of 
public goods.” 
17 Forte and Magazzino (2010, p.38): “It is quite interesting to note that for the Western Continental European 
countries – that have a common tradition of welfare state and complex labor institutions – the peak of the BARS 
curve is at a much lower level than for the Anglo-Saxon countries, which, at least from Thatcher’s reforms […], 
have a much more flexible labor market.” 
18 Ram (1986, p.191): found that the “the overall impact of government size on growth is positive in almost all 
cases; the marginal externality effect of government size is generally positive […] and there exists a broad 
harmony between the estimates obtained from cross-section and time series data.” 
19 When focusing on the time series analyses for France, Italia, Austria, Australia, Germany, Portugal, UK, USA, 
we realize that government size either does not play any role or has a negative influence. 
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(1989, p.242) who specify that “the negative relationship between government scale and 
productivity that [they] find is relevant for current ratios of government spending (about 
35%) […and] not inconsistent with the argument that there may be an “optimal” size of 
government”. The panel studied, is at least as decisive because, in view of the literature, the 
effect of government scale seems to deeply depend on economic, cultural and political 
institutions. Therefore it turns out to be very informative to perform long time-series analyses 
for a single country. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The objective of this study was to investigate both theoretically and empirically the 
relationship between government size and economic growth. Its theoretical originality was to 
resort to both theories of State and market failures to account for a non-linear, inverted U-
shaped relationship between government activity and economic performance. That turned out 
to be useful to specify the shape of the Armey curve by decomposing it into two curves 
standing for the costs of the State failures and the benefits from correcting market failures. It 
enabled us to unify in a single theoretical framework two sets of theories that generally are in 
completion or at best disregard each another.  
 
The empirical contribution of this paper was to provide evidence of the existence of an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between government size and economic output using time-
series data on France on a long period (1871- 2008). There are two main findings. First, it is 
not possible to find a robust relation with a linear equation of government size to explain GDP 
growth, while we found strong evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship, once we use a 
quadratic model. Second the optimal size of the French government would be 30% as a share 
of total GDP and was reached in the late 1940s. This figure contrast with the 20% figure 
found in the studies on the size of the US government but is rather in accordance with the 
literature on other countries and especially on Europe. However our long time-series analysis 
gives more credence to an optimal ratio of 30% compared to the higher ratios found by other 
studies on Europe and especially on France. Our finding tends to confirm the hypothesis of a 
multitude of optimal State sizes and therefore inverted U-shaped curves peculiar to each 
country or institutional design. 
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Table A.1 Data Presentation 
GDP_FR French annual Gross Domestic Product in million 1990 International 
Geary-Khamis dollars 
Source Maddison’s website: http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm 
Historical Statistics of the World Economy:  1-2008 AD- Table 2 
GDP_EU European annual Gross Domestic Product in million 1990 International 
Geary-Khamis dollars 
Source Maddison’s website http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm 
Historical Statistics of the World Economy:  1-2008 AD- Table 2: GDP 
levels-GDP Total 11 Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United-Kingdom) 
GSIZE Share of the total public spending (Central State, Social Protection and 
local public authorities)  as a percentage of the total GDP 
Source 1:  
1871-1913 
Levy-Leboyer and Bourguignon (1985, 1990): government consumption 
Source 2:  
1869-1974 
Andre and Delorme (1983): total public spending/ (constant price) GDP 
Source 3:  
1959-2008 
National accounts- INSEE (National Institute of Statistics and Economic 
Studies): (Billion constant euros) public administrations 
spending/(constant price) GDP 
OPEN Degree of openness of the French economy, given by the sum of the 
importations and exportations as a percentage of the GDP 
Source 1:  
1871-2002 
Asselain and Blancheton (2005): goods importations as a percentage of 
the (current price) GDP, goods exportations as a percentage of the 
(current price) GDP 
Source 2:  
1960-2009 
World Bank: the volume of trade as a percentage of GDP 
EMPLOY Average number of workers per year 
Source Bourlies, R., Cette, G., Lopez, J., Mairesse, J. and Nicoletti, G. (2010) 
TAX Total tax rate 
Source Piketty's website: 
http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/fichiers/public/Grasset2001/Livre/TabChap1.xls 
POP French total population 
Source Maddison’s website:http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm 
Historical Statistics of the World Economy:  1-2008 AD- Table 1: 
Population Levels, 1 AD - 2030 AD 
IDEOLOGY Percentage of the left-wing deputies in the Lower Chamber of the 
Parliament (Chamber of Deputies for the 3rd and 4th Republic and 
National Assembly for the 5th Republic) excluding French overseas 
departments and territories and excluding the independent 
Source Facchini and Melki (2011) 
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ELECT Dummy variable coded 1 for the elections years of the lower Chamber of 
the Parliament and 0 for the other years 
Source Facchini and Melki (2011) 
 
Table A.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
GDP_FR 71666 1423562 405380 404230 
GDP_EU 272324 5979349 1794625 1672267 
GSIZE 10.60 54.92 31.20 15.12 
OPEN 5.93 47.01 28.83 8.68 
EMPLOY 17923242 25493891 20118825 1909311 
TAX 0.062 0.501 0.281 0.153 
POP 37679 64058 46159 8066 
IDEOLOGY 0.139 0.887 0.545 0.212 
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Table A.3 Correlation matrix 
 
 
NOTES 
                                                 
i The French GDP Growth has eroded over time. The French economic history can be presented as follows (see Figure A.2 in appendix). The French economy experienced 
two main critical stages until the Second World War: 1860 – 1890, 1929 – 1939 (Asselain, 1984a, 172). On the contrary, from 1945 to 1973, it experienced a steady growth 
period. After that, the GDP growth slow downed and was even negative in 1993 and 2009. War played an important part in the evolution of the French growth at the end of 
the 19th century as well as during the 20th century. 
The 1860‐1890 period was called before 1929, “la Grande Crise”i. It corresponded approximately to the 1873‐1896 Kondratieff cycle of long‐run prices decrease. In 
France,  this  stage began during  the decade 1860 and was  confirmed by  the decrease  in  the GDP per  capita during  the 1880’s  (Lévy‐Leboyer 1971). The origins of  the 
decrease were the American Civil War, the phylloxera plague that destroyed harvest, the decreasing investment return in railway, the weight of trade between France and 
Great Britain and the agricultural depression. After the prosperous 1890‐1913 period (Asselain 1984a, ch.4), followed the 1914‐1918 war and the rebuilding from 1918 to 
1929. However, as early as 1924, the level of the French GDP and national income is the same as in 1913 but growth is quite fast (Asselain 1984b, p.25). 1929 is obviously a 
date of break down followed by a recession and imbalance period (1930 – 1935), which, contrary to numerous countries, lasted beyond.  
The 1937 reforms, under the “Front Populaire”, of the Blum’s government had only temporary effects. The 1937 and 1939  increases did not make up the deep 
recession of 1938. The economic instability corresponds to a high political instability: the fall of the Blum’s government and the accession of the Chautemps’s government 
in 1938. On the contrary, during the 1945‐1973 period, the annual GDP growth is high. On the 1949 – 1969 period the average annual growth rate is 4.6 and 6.6 from 1969 
to 1973  (Caron 1981, p.158).  From 1975, as numerous European developed  countries,  France experienced  very  low  growth  rates  compared  to prior and  to other big 
formerly industrialized countries like Great‐Britain or United‐States. 
 
 D(LN_GDP_FR) LN_GSIZE(t-1) LN_GSIZE(t-1)² D(LN_GDP_EU) D(LN_OPEN) D(LN_EMPLOY) D(LN_TAX(t-1)) D(LN_POP) ELECT IDEOLOGY 
D(LN_GDP_FR) 1.000000 0.142775 0.127040 0.656416 0.440749 0.510136 0.169934 0.356948 -0.090296 -0.225780 
LN_GSIZE(t-1) 0.142775 1.000000 0.998421 0.035166 0.146972 0.227999 -0.015026 0.383539 -0.027809 -0.654214 
LN_GSIZE(t-1)² 0.127040 0.998421 1.000000 0.015734 0.153474 0.238783 -0.031319 0.362657 -0.025258 -0.638826 
D(LN_GDP_EU) 0.656416 0.035166 0.015734 1.000000 0.413588 0.266096 0.131660 0.241625 -0.058067 -0.101275 
D(LN_OPEN) 0.440749 0.146972 0.153474 0.413588 1.000000 0.419004 -0.309432 0.211658 -0.151886 -0.131172 
D(LN_EMPLOY) 0.510136 0.227999 0.238783 0.266096 0.419004 1.000000 -0.178767 0.163775 -0.086168 -0.178704 
D(LN_TAX(t-1)) 0.169934 -0.015026 -0.031319 0.131660 -0.309432 -0.178767 1.000000 0.062229 0.021766 -0.128653 
D(LN_POP) 0.356948 0.383539 0.362657 0.241625 0.211658 0.163775 0.062229 1.000000 -0.013574 -0.505985 
ELECT -0.090296 -0.027809 -0.025258 -0.058067 -0.151886 -0.086168 0.021766 -0.013574 1.000000 0.024699 
IDEOLOGY -0.225780 -0.654214 -0.638826 -0.101275 -0.131172 -0.178704 -0.128653 -0.505985 0.024699 1.000000 
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